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any force that invaded the United States would simply have the ground it stood on?

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Gen. Miles: I will suppose an un-supposable case. Suppose they could put an army on a fleet of 500 ships and move it across the Atlantic without being disturbed by any naval power, and they could land. They certainly could not go into any port. They could not go into our ports any more than they could go through the Dardanelles. That has been demonstrated. Our forts are equipped and fortified as well as the Dardanelles. Suppose they got that far—as to land at some remote point—if we could not gather enough men in the Army and Militia, and by other means, to destroy that army before they could send their ships back and get another load, I would want to move to some other country.

cessful. A real war, a war with a prepared nation, will not be fought successfully by the United States until that principle is in every man's head. . . .

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Mr. McKenzie: General, knowing you to be a practical military man, I want to ask you how large an expeditionary force, in your judgment, could be landed on our shores within six months after hostilities opened?

Gen. Wood: A million or a million and one-half men; there is practically no limit to the number.

Mr. McKenzie: In six months?

Gen. Wood: Oh, yes; any first-class military power, well prepared, can land 250,000 men on our shores in 15 days, and do it easily, once they secured control of the sea.

PREPAREDNESS AND THE LABORING MAN

By WILLIAM WESTON PATTON

IF WAR should come to the nation, how would it affect the laboring man?

Let us first glance at history. No extended study is needed to prove that at one time war was profitable to the laboring class. From a successful campaign the warrior of antiquity returned laden with booty and slaves. The inhabitants of the conquered nation, together with their land, cattle, and goods were the prizes of war. War was a trade to men born in poverty. Its rewards were shared by both privates and officers. If full of great risk, it offered great rewards.

In comparatively recent times, during colonial acquisition, men fought for patriotic reasons. They also fought for the possession of hunting grounds and rich river bottoms. Our frontiersmen thus strove to control the Mississippi River, because securing such control meant profits to the laboring men of the frontier.

The evolution of ideas of property, however, has destroyed the possibility of such gains today. The land still in the possession of savage races is rapidly disappearing. Conquests must therefore be made upon civilized neighbors.

Here, however, an almost unnoticed but profound change has taken place in the institutions affected by war. The making of slaves of the inhabitants of a conquered province, or the distribution of the land among the privates of the victorious army, is unthinkable today. Even movable goods are expected to be paid for by the invading army. When Germany annexed Alsace and Lorraine, the individual German was not a mark the richer. The only way for him to get the land was to buy it. He could have done that as well before the war as after, because today migrations from one country to another are as common as from one city to another.

Some people may think that the indemnity exacted at the close of a war will make money so much "easier" in the victorious nation that benefits will ensue for the laboring man; that easy money generally means industrial expansion, and that industrial expansion profits the laboring man. For a complete answer to this line of reasoning, I refer the reader to Norman Angell's book, "The Great Illusion." In brief, I would turn with him to history.

In 1870 Germany exacted a fabulous indemnity from France. If the general proposition is true, that war benefits the laboring man in the victorious nation by making money "easier" for the expansion of industry in that nation, money should have been cheaper and more plentiful in Germany than in France after the war. The exact reverse is true. Beginning immediately after that war, and continuing until the present, Germany has been trying to borrow money from her victim. Within two years after the payment of the last installment of the indemnity, the bank rate in Berlin was higher than in Paris. France weathered the financial crisis of 1878-9 better than Germany, and until the war France secured money at 3 per cent, while Germany had to pay nearly 4 per cent.

Here is the paradox. France, the conquered, recovered faster financially than Germany, and became the lender, not the borrower.

The voice of labor seems to be against great preparedness for war. Opposition came from the convention of United Mine Workers gathered in Indianapolis. Men with money to invest do not seem to feel that armaments are a guarantee of prosperity, when we study the figures of the market sales. Two weeks before the present European war had broken out to affect the market, Belgium 3 per cents stood at 83 and German 3 per cents at 76, Norwegian 4 per cents at 99, and Russian 4 per cents at 87. These facts show that the ability to win in war does not form an inducement to capital to flow into a country. The argument, therefore, that money will be easier in the victorious nation after a war, and so benefit the laboring man through industrial expansion, would seem to need further support before it can be accepted.

It would be interesting to investigate the effect colonial dominion has upon the laboring man. We all can see that while the business man is drawn upon for capital to finance an enterprise of development in the colonies, and the professional man furnishes the ability, the laboring man is not transported to do the work. Native labor is used for that. Nor should the plutocracy, set up by having one's possessions out of the reach of home influences, be underestimated in its effect upon the laboring man.

What effect would a program of great preparedness have upon the laboring man, even if war did not follow in its wake?

A program of great preparedness retards the progress of social reform. It diverts capital from labor-benefiting channels. The United States of America pay annually for interests on war debts approximately \$22,616,000. For the past 30 years it has spent on the upkeep of its army and navy \$3,996,870,000.

Think how this money could be used for the benefit of the race. The country can spend that amount of money for war each year, and yet it is too poor to meet the obligations which the current formulation of social ethics imposes upon it. Current social conscience requires the State to free its citizens of the cost of epidemic diseases; to educate its children; segregate and exterminate the stream of moral degeneracy. The author has been unable to secure any definite estimate of the money spent annually in this country on social reform. He would be glad to compare it with our military expenditures.

"It is obviously the working class whose interests are most seriously prejudiced by any neglect on the state of its social obligations. It is the working class that suffers most severely from faulty sanitation and inadequate hospital service; from lack of playgrounds and contaminating tenements and consumptive breeding prisons. It is the children of the laboring class who are the first neglected in a lack of educational facilities." Accordingly, it can hardly be denied that there is at least a modicum of truth in the statement, that whoever pays the war taxes, it is upon the workers that the whole burden finally rests.

Social reforms also are retarded by a program of great preparedness, because the discussion of such a program attracts the attention of the public away from needed reforms. In a republic this danger is especially present. For in a republic the selection and the conduct of public officials must be under the surveillance of the man in the street. Many an official, inadequate for the general welfare of the nation, will ride into power on the wave of "patriotism" which he has aroused. There are times when patriotism is like red pepper—very effective in producing temporary blindness, when thrown into the eyes of the public. We need only recall the comparison of headlines two years ago, when our Mexican situation in Vera Cruz was acute. Big two-inch type on the front page proclaimed the need of armies and navies. Little ordinary headline type on the back page of some papers announced to the public the account of the Ludlow battle in the coal fields of Colorado. It is certainly not putting the emphasis entirely in the wrong place to suggest that the latter bit of news indicates a condition of much greater danger to the laboring man than the Mexican situation. Yet the public attention was distracted from needed home reform by the cry of preparedness for a war abroad, which could be and was prevented by diplomacy.

The withdrawing of any great number of men from the activities of society at large, to maintain an army, throws a correspondingly greater burden upon those who still remain in the productive trades. Each year the world is demanding more articles of every sort. More men are therefore needed continually, even though machinery is facilitating the process.

The men in the army and navy, above those needed

for police duties, are of necessity parasites upon the community. They are making nothing of material or moral benefit for society. They are adding nothing of mental value. Yet there is just so much productive work to be done each day. If these men are compelled to neglect their share, that share must be done by some one else. As the vast majority of the army consists of men from the laboring class, it follows that the laboring men who remain in the industries must carry this burden.

Militarism and democracy cannot exist together. Rome lost her political liberties when the military emperors came to the throne. France lost the ideals and the fruits of her fight against monarchy when Napoleon seized the government at St. Cloud and intimidated the land with the army. Washington warned us against a military caste. Germany's military efficiency has been purchased at the price of limited franchise and irritating handicaps to personal liberties.

Obedience—blind, absolute, instant—is the keystone of military efficiency. Such obedience, such unthinking and unquestioning acceptance of orders, is the death knell of democracy, for democracy rests upon the higher characteristic of self-control and balanced self-initiative. Militarism injects back into civil life, after its years of training, large numbers of men who have been drilled to drastic action, through blind obedience, without careful thought.

No one will question that democracy is essential to the advance of the laboring class. It is only as the toiler gains equal political influence that he can expect industrial justice. If militarism is opposed to democracy, it injures the laboring man. We are getting tired of international aristocracy. We want democracy in world politics as well as in national politics. The laboring man is getting tired of being a pawn in the hands of a military caste, to be used in wars or preparation for wars, which bring him nothing.

POPULARIZING PEACE

By JAMES J. HALL

ONE of the saddest remarks made by Mr. Henry Ford upon his return from Europe was that he found the people there wanted war. I have no desire to dispute his statement, but wish to call attention to the fact that there can be no permanent peace without a demand on the part of the people for peace. Our peace societies must more and more reach out for the common people. There is room for every peace agency now at work, but the task will not be accomplished until the people see the folly and the crime of war, see it so as to hate it, and demand that it shall not be.

To reach this end, there must be definite work. The people must be reached and won, and they are wise who give their thought to this object. It will take thousands, if not millions, of dollars; but who can question the wisdom of such an investment? The victory of peace must yet be won among the masses.

Popular lectures among the people, reaching hundreds of thousands, are needed; a literature that will find its way into the homes of the working people; an educational propaganda that will touch every laboring man and keep touching him until he shall arouse him-